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Utah’s Enabling Act and Congress’s Enclave Clause
Authority: Federalism Implications of a Renewed State
Sovereignty Movement
I. INTRODUCTION: UTAH’S CLAIM AND THE ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION’S ENCLAVE CLAUSE
On June 20, 1783, a disgruntled group of unpaid soldiers arrived at
the statehouse in Philadelphia where the Continental Congress was
convened.1 The following day, the soldiers surrounded the statehouse,
demanding payment and attempting to intimidate the Congress by their
mere presence; some soldiers at times even “point[ed] their muskets to
the windows of the hall of Congress.”2 After drinking at neighboring
taverns, the soldiers formed a mock obstruction as the Congress
adjourned, but ultimately let the members of Congress pass through.3
Mixed reports circulated about the group’s intentions—at one point the
soldiers were reportedly “penitent,” while at another they were
“meditating more violent measures.”4
In response, Congress requested the presence of the state militia. As
they waited for the state to respond, members in the body doubted
whether the militia could force the group to disperse, as the soldiers’
obstruction may not have been considered “sufficient provocation.”5
Two days later, Congress realized the state was not going to act, so they
moved their deliberations to Trenton.6 Fueled by state inaction at
Philadelphia, Congress later authorized the construction of a more

1. JAMES
MADISON,
JOURNAL
OF
THE
CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION,
reprinted in 5 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 93 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1845) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES].
2. Id. For a more complete description of the soldiers’ actions and the early history of the
Enclave Clause, see THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF JURISDICTION OVER
FED. AREAS WITHIN THE STATES, REPORT PART II: A TEXT OF THE LAW OF LEGISLATIVE
JURISDICTION 15–28 (1957), available at http://constitution.org/juris/fjur /2fj1-2.txt [hereinafter
JURISDICTION REPORT].
3. ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 93.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See JURISDICTION REPORT, supra note 2, at 17; see also ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note
1, at 94.
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permanent home for itself along the Delaware River. Buildings were to
be erected on land over which the United States would have “the right of
soil, and an exclusive or such other jurisdiction as Congress may
direct.”7 Although the immediate push for a piece of separate land would
subside,8 the Framers ultimately incorporated the need for a separate
location into the Constitution through a somewhat obscure provision,
known as the Enclave Clause, which gives Congress power
[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such
District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of
particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of
the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority
over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State
in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines,
Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings.9

The Enclave Clause serves two main functions: first, it gives
Congress exclusive authority over the seat of the federal government
(now Washington, D.C.); second, it gives Congress authority to purchase
state land for important government installations. However, due in part to
state concern over federal encroachment, it also requires Congress to
obtain consent if it desires exclusive authority over any of the land it
purchases.10 As will be discussed at length in this Comment, the reach of
the Enclave Clause and state jurisdiction over federal enclaves may
actually be quite limited, given Congress’s expansive authority under the
Property Clause and the Supremacy Clause.11 Furthermore, the Supreme
Court has narrowly interpreted the reach of the Enclave Clause in a
number of its decisions.12
Although the reach of the Enclave Clause is quite narrow, the state of
Utah has relied on the clause in its battle against the federal government

7. NEW JERSEY RESOLUTION, reprinted in WILLIAM TINDALL, ORIGIN AND GOVERNMENT
39 (1909).
8. JURISDICTION REPORT, supra note 2, at 17 (“In view of the absence of a repetition of the
experience which gave rise to the resolution, it may be that the feelings of urgency for the
acquisition of exclusive jurisdiction diminished.”).
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (the “Enclave Clause”).
10. See infra Part III.A.
11. See infra Part III.D.
12. See, e.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976); Fort Leavenworth R.R. Co. v.
Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1885). The impact of these cases is described in greater detail in Parts III.C and
III.E.
OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
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to regain control over the state’s public lands. Unlike the state of
Pennsylvania, which could not protect Congress on state land during its
deliberations in Philadelphia, Utah is actively attempting to expel the
government from the state’s public lands.
For example, on March 23, 2012, Utah Governor Gary Herbert
signed the Transfer of Public Lands Act—a bill that denounces federal
control over the state’s public lands.13 It threatens a lawsuit if the federal
government fails to return title to the vast majority of its landholdings to
the state by 2015.14 In 2010, Utah passed another bill claiming eminent
domain authority over these lands because the federal government had
not properly acquired the lands as required by the Enclave Clause.15 The
strength of these two pieces of the state’s argument—its reliance on the
Enclave Clause and attendant claim to eminent domain—are the main
focuses of this Comment.
In tying its argument to the Enclave Clause, the state relies primarily
on the Utah Enabling Act (UEA), which President Grover Cleveland
signed into law on July 16, 1894.16 In addition to bringing Utah into the
Union, the Act effectively transferred title of state land to the federal
government. However, it also provided for the sale and transfer of those
lands back to the state, as follows:
[F]ive per centum of the proceeds of the sales of public lands lying
within said State, which shall be sold by the United States subsequent
to the admission of said State into the Union, after deducting all the
expenses incident to the same, shall be paid to the said State.17

Utah legislators have relied on this provision of the UEA in contending
that the federal government has not fulfilled its obligation to sell off its
public land holdings within the state, which currently amount to nearly
18
sixty percent of Utah’s land. Because the lands have not otherwise
been purchased under the Enclave Clause, the state of Utah contends that

13. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63L-6-101 to -104 (West 2012). A more complete summary of the
bill and its legislative history is available at http://le.utah.gov/~2012/bills/static/HB0148 .html.
14. Id.
15. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-503.5 (West 2010). This bill, sponsored by Utah
Representative Herrod, is discussed in greater detail in Part II.C.
16. Utah Enabling Act, 28 Stat. 107 §§ 3, 9 (1894).
17. Id. § 5.
18. The Open West, Owned by the Federal Government, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/03/23/us/western-land-owned-by-the-federalgovernment.html.
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its eminent domain authority extends over them.19 The state’s own
legislative attorneys recognized the difficulty inherent in the state’s
challenge,20 but the governor has deemed this uphill battle “a fight worth
having.”21
This Comment analyzes Utah’s Enclave Clause argument and
concludes that although success in court is unlikely, any potential of such
success hinges on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the UEA. Most
centrally, Utah must successfully argue that the federal government’s
ownership of the land is invalid. Part II discusses the history of public
lands movements, including Utah’s, to demonstrate the difficult battle
that the state will face. Despite this bleak history, and even if the Court
does not permit Utah to exercise its eminent domain authority, the state
will still certainly be able to exert pressure on the Obama Administration
to scale back its more restrictive land use policies.
Part III provides a history of the Enclave Clause and its development
through Supreme Court precedent, while it also more thoroughly
discusses each constitutional obstacle the state faces, including the Equal
Footing Doctrine and the Property Clause. In conclusion, this Comment
reviews the potential success of Utah’s Enclave Clause claim in this
public lands debate and weighs Utah’s options in the current political
atmosphere.
II. PUBLIC LANDS MOVEMENTS: FROM THE SAGEBRUSH REBELLION TO
UTAH’S CURRENT EFFORTS
The fight against federal ownership of public lands is not unique to
Utah; in fact, proponents for state and local management of public lands
have raised many of the same concerns during previous public lands
movements, including the Sagebrush Rebellion and the County
Supremacy Movement.
A. FLPMA and the “Sagebrush Rebellion”
The first major public lands movement, deemed the “Sagebrush

19. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-503.5 (West 2010).
20. Id. The constitutional note included by the state’s legislative attorneys can be found
online as an appendage to the bill at http://le.utah.gov/~2010/bills/hbillint/hb0143.pdf.
21. Debbie Hummel, Utah Demands Federal Government Return Public Lands to State,
REUTERS,
Mar.
24,
2012,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/24/us-utah-landsidUSBRE82N03420120324.
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Rebellion,” came in response to the federal government’s enactment of
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA).22 Numerous
Western states and their Congressmen, including Utah Senator Orrin
Hatch, became frustrated over President Jimmy Carter’s environmental
policies, which restricted access to public lands by increasing grazing
fees, scaling back drilling permits, and limiting access to natural
resources.23
Before Congress Passed FLPMA in 1976, federal lands were sold off
consistently to the states and other private interests and purchasers.
FLMPA dramatically reversed this longstanding policy and called for
“public lands [to] be retained in Federal ownership unless . . . it is
determined that disposal of a particular parcel will serve the national
interest.”24 This policy of national retention upset a great deal of
landowners—especially in the West—because it extended federal control
over these lands instead of gradually shifting it toward private and state
ownership.25 FLPMA soon became a campaign issue, and Ronald
Reagan even told supporters in a campaign speech that “[t]he next
administration won’t treat the West as if it were not worthy of attention.
The next administration will reflect the values and goals of the
Sagebrush Rebellion. Indeed, we can turn the Sagebrush Rebellion into
the Sagebrush Solution.”26
Supporters of the rebellion made the movement more about state
sovereignty concerns than access to lands, and they took legal action to
support their views.27 Many credit Nevada State Senator Dean Rhoads
with igniting the Sagebrush Rebellion because he initiated legislation,
like several representatives in Utah, which asserted state authority over
federal public lands. Supporters of the rebellion filed several lawsuits

22. Pub. L. No. 94-579 (1978).
23. Richard Blakemore, The Sagebrush Rebellion: A Response to Federal Land Policy in the
West, 36 J. SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION 146, 148 (1981); see The Sagebrush Rebellion, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 1, 1980, available at http://www2.vcdh.virginia.edu/
PVCC/mbase/docs/sagebrush.html.
24. Federal Land Policy and Management Act § 102(a)(1); see The Federal Land Policy and
Management Act (FLPMA) of 1976: How the Stage Was Set for BLM’s “Organic Act”, BUREAU OF
LAND MGMT. (last visited Aug. 23, 2012), http://www.blm.gov/flpma/organic.htm.
25. The Sagebrush Rebellion, supra note 23.
26. Id.
27. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND THE
FUTURE OF THE WEST 99 (1992).
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against the Department of the Interior to cull federal protected land
designations, but unlike the current movement in Utah, they did not
focus on constitutional claims.28
In 1980, President Reagan was elected, and the victory “cooled off
the rebellion.”29 Supportive individuals in the Reagan Administration
quickly recognized that the solution offered by the Sagebrush Rebellion
was problematic because it would merely replace federal bureaucratic
control with state bureaucratic control.30 Still, the sympathetic Reagan
administration did work with state and local officials to develop a more
collaborative regime of land management,31 an impact that is echoed in
Secretary Salazar’s current efforts to co-manage land with state and local
officials.32 Furthermore, the zeal from this movement lingered into the
1990s and fueled the “County Supremacy Movement.”
B. The 1990s and the County Supremacy Movement
In the 1990s, Westerners again sought to shake federal control over
public lands, but this time the fervor was stoked by President Clinton’s
environmental policies. Legislators in Nevada were particularly ardent
supporters of the movement because of the amount of the state’s land
held by the federal government; the government today still owns nearly
eighty-five percent of Nevada land.33
The “County Supremacy Movement” came to a head in Nevada on
July 4, 1994, when Nye County Commissioner Richard Carver bulldozed
a road through Toiyabe National Forest in Nevada34 and arrested a

28. See, e.g., Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Hodel, 790 F.2d 760 (1986) (challenging a DOI
conservation area designation in Idaho); Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525 (1983)
(challenging the DOI’s further designations on the land in Idaho).
29. Kurt J. Repanshek, New ‘Sagebrush Rebellion’ Smolders in Western States, L.A. TIMES;
Dec. 2, 1990, at 24, available at http://articles.latimes.com/1990-12-02/news/mn-7915_1_sagebrushrebellion.
30. Steve H. Hanke, The Privatization Debate: An Insider’s View, 2 CATO J. 653, 655
(1982).
31. Id. at 653.
32. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
33. See id.
34. Carolyn M. Landever, Whose Home on the Range? Equal Footing, the New Federalism
and State Jurisdiction on Public Lands, 47 FLA. L. REV. 557, 557 (1995); see also William
Chaloupka, The County Supremacy and Militia Movements: Federalism as an Issue on the Radical
Right, 26 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 161, 163 (1996).
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Forest Service agent for trying to intervene.35 Carver acted in response to
state legislation that had been passed in 1979 during the Sagebrush
Rebellion, which asserted that the “State of Nevada owns all public lands
within the borders of the State of Nevada.”36 Nevada was not the only
state to pass such legislation—in fact, officials in New Mexico passed
similar ordinances concerning federal public lands,37 as did as many as
fifty-eight other counties throughout the West.38 Nye County officials
were particularly upset, however, since in their county the United States
owned nearly ninety-three percent of the land.39
In response to Commissioner Carver’s actions, the Department of
Justice (DOJ) filed a suit against the county and circulated a memo to
federal officials reasserting federal control over these lands.40 County
officials relied heavily on the Equal Footing Doctrine to mount their
defense, but unlike Utah’s current efforts, they did not incorporate the
Enclave Clause into their case. The County Supremacy Movement came
to an end with the county’s failed defense of the DOJ lawsuit in 1996.41
The
New
York
Times
deemed the result of the lawsuit “a major blow to dozens of counties that
have passed [similar] ordinances.”42
Although unsuccessful in his goal to recapture control of the federal
lands, Commissioner Carver was content that federal officials had been
increasingly cooperative in their land development efforts.43 Both the
Sagebrush Rebellion and the County Supremacy Movement at the very

35. Landever, supra note 34, at 557–58; see also Paul Conable, Comment, Equal Footing,
County Supremacy, and the Western Public Lands, 26 ENVT’L L. 1263, 1281 (1996).
36. NEV. REV. STAT. § 321.5973 (1979).
37. Chaloupka, supra note 34, at 162–63.
38. Id. at 163.
39. United States v. Nye Cnty., 920 F. Supp. 1108, 1110 (D. Nev. 1996).
40. Id. at 1109; DEPT. OF JUSTICE, United States Sues Nye County, Nevada to Reaffirm
Control Over Federal Lands and Quell Intimidation of Federal Employees (Mar. 8, 1995),
JUSTICE.GOV, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/Pre_96/March95/127.txt.html.
41. See Timothy Egan, Court Puts Down Rebellion Over Control of Federal land, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 16, 1996, at A1.
42. Id.
43. Nevada’s ‘Sagebrush Rebel’ Happy with Results of His Defiant Bulldozing, DESERET
NEWS (Nov. 13, 1996), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/524271/NEVADAS-SAGE BRUSHREBEL-HAPPY-WITH-RESULTS-OF-HIS-DEFIANT-BULLDOZING.html.
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least can be credited with an increased willingness on the part of the
federal government to collaborate on land management and regulatory
concerns.44
C. The State of Utah’s Efforts to Regain Control over its Public Lands
Like the Sagebrush Rebellion and the County Supremacy Movement,
Utah’s current campaign against the federal government formed in
response to a new president’s restrictive land use policies—this time
President Obama’s. In 2009, the Obama Administration suspended the
sale of thirty-one oil and gas drilling parcels in Utah over concerns that
the drilling would harm the surrounding wildlife.45 Earlier that year,
Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar revoked seventy-seven leases that
would have allowed for oil, gas, and mineral development on Bureau of
Land Management (BLM) land within Utah.46 In addition, Secretary
Salazar instituted a process by which additional federal land would be
protected
from

development by giving it a “wild lands” designation,47 which has drawn

44. See Hanke, supra note 30.
45. Paul Foy, BLM Suspends Sale of Utah Drilling Leases, WY. TRIB. (June 23, 2009),
http://trib.com/news/state-and-regional/blm-suspends-sale-of-utah-drilling-leases/article_0b673ad04509-506c-be56-dc02d951a9a8.html.
46. Michael B. Farrell, Utah Uses Eminent Domain to Seize Land of . . . Uncle Sam, ABC
NEWS (May 9, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/utah-eminent-domain-seize-land-unclesam/story?id=10584565; Phil Taylor, Oil and Gas: BLM Did Not Improperly ‘Rush’ Canceled Utah
Leases, IG Report Finds, E&E PUB. (July 15, 2010), http://www.eenews.net/
public/Landletter/2010/07/15/1.
47. See Julie Cart, Salazar Backpedals: Politics Stalls Wilderness Designation, Again, L.A.
TIMES BLOG (June 11, 2011), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/greenspace/2011/06/ politics-placeswilderness-designation-placed-in-limbo-.html. This “wild lands” designation process would inhibit
development similar to the executive authority under the Antiquities Act, though it would only
require secretarial approval to do so. See Press Release, Jason Chaffetz, Utah Congressional
Delegation Supports Locally Driven Wilderness Approach (Sept. 8, 2011), available at
http://chaffetz.house.gov/press-release/utah-congressional-delegation-supports-locally-drivenwilderness-approach.
Concerned members of Congress temporarily revoked Secretary Salazar’s authority to make
these designations during FY 2011. Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing
Appropriations Act, 2011, Pub. L. 112-10, § 1769 (2011). Other states, including Utah, have taken
legal action against the federal government to curb this authority as well. Brandon Loomis, Utah
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a

significant

amount

of

criticism.48

In response, Utah legislators passed legislation to reassert control
over the affected lands. On February 11, 2010, Utah Representative
Chris Herrod introduced legislation that effectively empowered the state
of Utah to exercise eminent domain authority over federal lands that
were not acquired in accordance with the United States Constitution.49
The bill contained a pessimistically worded legislative note warning
legislators of the constitutional challenges the bill would undoubtedly
confront because of conflicts with the Property Clause and the Equal
Footing Doctrine.50
Two years later, and in the face of continued warnings that its claims
would be deemed unconstitutional,51 the Utah State Legislature passed a
series of bills claiming eminent domain authority on behalf of the State.
Governor Herbert recently signed a bill sponsored by Representative Ken
Ivory that calls on the federal government to return title of the vast
majority of public land back to the state of Utah. 52 Representative Ivory,
who has spearheaded the most recent round of legislation, has noted that
“[i]t’s a promise made to Utah 116 years ago at statehood.”53
Utah’s congresspeople have backed the state legislature’s efforts by
recently supporting a bill that would protect Utah’s lands from any
further presidential monument designations.54 They have also supported

Sues Feds over Wildlands Policy, SALT LAKE TRIB. (May 14, 2011), http://www.sltrib.com/
sltrib/politics/51720408-90/wilderness-lands-utah-policy.html.csp.
48. Because of the overwhelming response, Secretary Salazar has been forced to take a more
collaborative approach to the process, and has even visited Utah multiple times to demonstrate that
he is interacting locally. Cart, supra note 47; see also DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, Salazar Takes Next
Steps in Push for Bipartisan Wilderness Agenda, (June 10, 2011), DOI.GOV,
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-Takes-Next-Steps-In-Push-for-BipartisanWilderness-Agenda.cfm; Josh Loftin, Interior Secretary Ken Salazar Visiting Utah, DESERET NEWS
(Sept. 28, 2011), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/700183105/ Interior-Secretary-Ken-Salazarvisiting-Utah.html.
49. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-503.5 (West 2010). The text of this bill is available online
with an important legislative note at http://le.utah.gov/~2010/bills/hbillint /hb0143.pdf.
50. Id.
51. See Robert Gehrke, Utah House Panel OKs Bill to Let Cities Seize Fed Land, SALT LAKE
TRIB. (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/politics/53529358-90/authority-bill-citiescounties.html.csp.
52. 2012 Utah Laws Ch. 353 (H.B. 148).
53. Bob Bernick, Bill Stakes Claim to Federal Lands in Utah, UTAHPULSE.COM (Jan. 30,
2012), http://utahpulse.com/bookmark/17331882-Bill-Stakes-Claim-to-Federal-Lands-in-Utah.
54. Utah Lands Sovereignty Act, H.R. 2147, 112th Cong. (2011) (prohibiting the further
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efforts to sell off more public lands, which has met some opposition
(parodied by a recent Salt Lake Tribune political cartoon, below).55 Like
many other members of Congress from the West, Utah’s delegation is
concerned that the current administration will overextend federal
authority under the Antiquities Act, which permits the president to make
such designations.56
The delegation has real cause for concern since President Clinton
used his power under the Antiquities Act to protect 1.9 million acres of
land in Southern Utah from development by giving it the designation of
Grand Staircase Escalante National Monument.57 Utah’s state legislature
is similarly concerned, and has ridden the recent anti-federal sentiment58
by factoring the issue into the recent decennial redistricting process.59

extension or establishment of national monuments in Utah except by express authorization of
Congress);see also Press Release, Bishop, Chaffetz, Hatch, Lee Introduce Bill to Protect Utah from
Presidential
Monument
Designations
(June
14,
2011),
available
at
http://lee.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=cb082493-7628-4a25-906b-3cc73349343c.
55. Thomas Burr, Chaffetz Pushes Bill to Sell ‘Excess’ Federal Lands, SALT LAKE TRIB.
(Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/politics/52774161-90/lands-chaffetz-utah-bill.html.csp;
see Pat Bagley, Bagley Cartoon: Sign, Sign, Everywhere a Sign, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Oct. 25, 2011),
http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/opinion/52781990-82/sign-bagley-cartoon-everywhere.html.csp.
56. NAT’L PARKS SERV., National Monument Proclamations under the Antiquities Act,
NPS.GOV, http://www.cr.nps.gov/history/hisnps/npshistory/monuments.htm (last visited Aug. 23,
2012). For a thorough discussion of these concerns and the history of the Antiquities Act, see Frank
Norris, The Antiquities Act and the Acreage Debate, GEORGE WRIGHT F., 2006, at 6, available at
http://www.georgewright.org/233norris.pdf.
57. Kirk Johnson, In the West, ‘Monument’ Is a Fighting Word, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/20/us/politics/20utah.html.
58. See, e.g., Jim Carlton, Federal Land Seizures Urged by Utah Governor, WALL ST. J.
(March
30,
2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230437030457515169
3915722022.html.
59. H.C.R. 17, 59th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2010); see also Amy Joi O’Donoghue, Utah
Legislature: Opposition to Future National Monuments Clears House, DESERET NEWS (Mar. 9,
2010),
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/700014943/Utah-Legislature-Opposition-to-futurenational-monuments-clears-house.html; Josh Loftin, Public Lands Driving Utah Redistricting
Debate, REAL CLEAR POLITICS (Oct. 2, 2011), http://www.realclearpolitics.com
/news/ap/politics/2011/Oct/02/public_lands_driving_utah_redistricting_debate.html.
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Utah’s state legislature and congressional delegation have both been
strong proponents of local public land management and have brought
attention to the state’s concerns, but opponents have attacked their bills,
calling them mere “message bills.”60 Utah undoubtedly has several
constitutional hurdles to clear,61 but Utah lawmakers feel that this
opposition is worth challenging—especially considering the potential
benefits to the state, including both control over land rich in natural
resources and property tax revenues that would increase significantly.62
Representative Herrod estimates that the coal reserves under Grand
Staircase-Escalante National Monument alone are valued at around $1
trillion,63 and supporters see it as a chance to gain back “the right to
develop the disputed land and generate some $50 billion for the state’s
public schools.”64
60. Scott Streater, Utah Eminent Domain Law More than a “Message Bill”, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 2, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/04/01/01greenwire-utah-eminent-domain-lawmore-than-a-message-bi-25839.html?pagewanted=all.
61. This is especially true given the more recent failure of Nye County. See United States v.
Nye Cnty., 920 F. Supp. 1108, 1109 (D. Nev. 1996); see also Eugene Volokh, Can a State Take
Federal Land by Eminent Domain?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 29, 2010, 3:57 PM),
http://volokh.com/2010/03/29/can-a-state-take-federal-land-by-eminent-domain/ (likening
seizing
federal property to taxing the Bank of the United States).
62. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-503.5 (West 2010).
63. Chris Herrod, Reasserting State Sovereignty in Public Lands Management: The Eminent
Domain Authority for Federal Lands Act, INSIDE ALEC, Nov./Dec. 2010, at 6–7.
64. Robert Gehrke, Utah Lawmakers Propose Using Eminent Domain to Take Federal Land,
S.L. TRIB., Feb. 11, 2010, http://www.sltrib.com/ci_14377307.
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Because the state’s actions do pose serious constitutional concerns,
as noted by the state’s own legislative attorneys, this Comment will focus
on the soundness of the state’s constitutional claims. A major premise of
Utah’s claim is that it never ceded exclusive jurisdiction over the state’s
public lands under the Enclave Clause.65 Furthermore, the state contends
that the federal government has failed to divest itself of the state’s public
lands in accordance with the Utah Enabling Act (UEA),66 which acts as a
mandate on Congress to sell off the public lands that were temporarily
entrusted to it during Utah’s admission into the Union. In making this
argument, Utah lawmakers point to language in the UEA: “five per
centum of the proceeds of the sales of public lands lying within said
State, which shall be sold by the United States subsequent to the
admission of said State into the Union . . . shall be paid to the said
State . . . .”67 State and local opposition to the federal government’s
restrictions on public land use is nothing new, but the fact that Utah so
centrally asserted its authority under the Enclave Clause is a position
unique to this movement.68 Since the state has not yet filed suit, and
hence there are no official legal arguments made by the state as of yet,
this Comment will evaluate arguments that are both incorporated into
legislation and commonly made by its lawmakers. Thus, any reference
hereafter
to
the
“state’s”
claims or “Utah’s” claims refers only to likely arguments posited by state
lawmakers and/or incorporated into legislation.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL OBSTACLES TO UTAH’S CLAIMS
To more fully understand how the state’s Enclave Clause argument
is impacted by the UEA and the various aforementioned constitutional
provisions, this Part of the Comment first briefly summarizes these
interactions. It then reviews the text and history of the Enclave Clause
and analyzes Utah’s cession of land in the Utah Enabling Act in light of
this understanding. Finally, this Part examines the limitations and

65. Herrod, supra note 63; see also Utah Enabling Act, 28 Stat. 107 §§ 3, 9 (1894). By public
lands, these lawmakers are not referring to National Parks and other valid federal enclaves. See
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63L-6-101 to -104 (West 2012).
66. Utah Enabling Act §§ 3, 9.
67. Id. § 9.
68. See Part II.A (Sagebrush Rebellion); II.B (The County Supremacy Movement).
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challenges on Utah’s Enclave Clause argument by reviewing the
Supreme Court’s Enclave Clause, Equal Footing, and Property Clause
jurisprudence.
A. A Brief Summary: Some Complex Constitutional Interactions
It is impossible to gauge the strength of Utah’s Enclave Clause
argument without first understanding how the Property Clause and the
Equal Footing Doctrine potentially weaken the state’s claim. This Part
briefly summarizes the impact of these provisions and how they bear on
the Supreme Court’s possible future ruling and interpretation of the Utah
Enabling Act.
First, Utah is likely to face a challenge by the federal government’s
authority under the Property Clause. As articulated in the Constitution,
the Property Clause gives Congress the power to “dispose of and make
all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other
Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution
shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or
of any particular State.”69
The authority granted to Congress here is quite encompassing—
Congress may “dispose of” and “make all needful Rules and
Regulations” concerning its lands.70 The Supreme Court has also
interpreted this clause as a broad grant of authority—a power “without
limitations.”71 Utah’s legislative attorneys have clearly identified the
Property Clause as the single-largest barrier to the state’s claim.72
However, the Property Clause extends only to “[t]erritory or other
Property belonging to the United States.”73 The state of Utah contends
that the public lands in question do not rightfully “belong[] to the United
States”74 because Congress was to “dispose of”75 these lands under the
UEA. The language of the UEA seems to support this argument, since it
provides that Utah would receive “five per centum of the proceeds of the
sales of public lands lying within said State,” and that these public lands
69. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
70. Id. (emphasis added).
71. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 530 (1976) (quoting United States v. San
Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 (1940); see also infra Part III.D.
72. Supra note 20.
73. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
74. Id. (emphasis added).
75. Id.
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“shall be sold by the United States subsequent to the admission of said
State into the Union.”76 Although Congress previously divested itself of
large sections of land under the UEA for schools and other government
buildings,77 this ended with the passage of FLPMA in 1976.78 At
bottom, to overcome a property clause challenge, Utah must successfully
argue that federal ownership of the contested lands is outright invalid.
Second, the federal government is likely to challenge Utah’s claim to
eminent domain authority over the contested lands. Through HB 143,
passed in 2010, Utah claimed eminent domain authority over lands not
“owned by the federal government in accordance with the United States
Constitution Article I, Section 8, Clause 17.”79 This provision, known as
the Enclave Clause, gives Congress the power “[t]o exercise [exclusive
legislation] over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature
of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts,
Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings.”80
Because Congress did not acquire the public lands in question by consent
and is not using the land for “Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards,
and other needful Buildings,”81 the state claims the federal government
lacks authority over the land.
If Utah were to rely on this clause alone, however, it would face
constitutional difficulties because the federal government may acquire
land not only under the Enclave Clause, but also through the exercise of
eminent domain, which supersedes state authority under the Supremacy
Clause.82 Thus, although the Enclave Clause arguably pertains to only a
very “narrow category of federal property,”83 later discussion will show
that the federal government may also rightfully acquire land by eminent
76. Utah Enabling Act, 28 Stat. 107, (1894) (emphasis added).
77. Id. §§ 6–8.
78. FLPMA fundamentally altered the federal-state relationship with regards to public lands
holdings—an issue that is discussed in more detail in Robert L. Fischman & Jeremiah Williamson,
The Story of Kleppe v. New Mexico: The Sagebrush Rebellion as Un-Cooperative Federalism, 83
U. COLO. L. REV. 123, 146 (2011) (“The FLPMA required the BLM, for the first time, not only to
coordinate with and ‘assure that consideration is given to’ relevant state-authorized plans, but also to
‘provide for meaningful public involvement of State and local government officials.’”) (citing 43
U.S.C. § 1712(c)(9) (2006)).
79. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-503.5 (West 2010).
80. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (emphasis added).
81. Id.
82. See infra Part III.D.
83. Eugene R. Gaetke, Refuting the “Classic” Property Clause Theory, 63 N.C. L. REV. 617,
619 n.5 (1985).
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domain for valid governmental purposes like national parks.84 However,
Congress has not exercised such authority here. The millions of acres of
federal public lands in question have never been acquired either through
Congress’s Enclave Clause authority or through eminent domain. In sum,
to survive a challenge to the state’s exercise of eminent domain, Utah
must centrally assert that the federal government’s control of the
contested lands is invalid, since it has neither obtained the land through
the Enclave Clause nor claimed it through the exercise of eminent
domain. The federal government is unlikely to make a claim of eminent
domain here, as this would signify that it does not currently hold title to
the contested lands.
Third, and finally, the federal government will likely challenge
Utah’s assertions under the Equal Footing Doctrine. While the doctrine
itself is unlikely to fully support the state, the state is likely to use the
Supreme Court’s broad dicta and federalism discussion on the issue. The
Equal Footing Doctrine, as utilized by public lands movements in the
past,85 can be summarized as follows: when a new state is admitted to
the Union, it must be given the same legal and political rights as the
preexisting states. In terms of authority over public lands, this means that
states must be granted equal authority over public lands within their state
boundaries. However, the doctrine may be limited to claims that concern
the land underlying navigable waters.86 States’ rights supporters rely
heavily on a particular statement in Pollard v. Hagan, though, to expand
its reach: “[T]he United States never held any municipal sovereignty,
jurisdiction, or right of soil in and to the territory, of which Alabama or
any of the new states were formed; except for temporary
purposes . . . .”87
Using this language, Utah is likely to argue that in order for states
like Utah to be admitted on “equal footing,” the Court must interpret
Utah’s cession of land under the UEA as being done “for temporary

84. See infra Part III.D.
85. See supra Parts II.A–.B.
86. For states admitted to the Union after the country’s formation, the Supreme Court has
held (as in Pollard), that such an interpretation applied to the land underlying waterways. However,
the Equal Footing Doctrine does not necessarily touch such a narrow category of land—the Supreme
Court has also held that it acts as a limit on Congress from requiring anything in a state’s Enabling
Act that would limit its future sovereignty as a state, including the power to change the location of a
state capital. See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 565 (1911).
87. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 221 (1845).
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purposes”88 only. Utah legislators have thus argued that the federal
government was supposed to act only as a temporary trustee over Utah’s
lands until the conditions in the UEA were fulfilled.89 The state’s public
lands were then to be sold and the State was to receive five percent of the
proceeds of those sales.90
In support of its claim, Utah is likely to rely on supporting arguments
offered by all of the aforementioned constitutional provisions—the
Property Clause, the Enclave Clause, and the Equal Footing Doctrine.
And for its claim to succeed, Utah must strategically employ the
language from the UEA in light of these provisions—particularly the
Enclave Clause—to argue that the federal government is bound by the
UEA’s conditions and that it has never validly held title to the contested
lands.

B. History of the Constitution’s Enclave Clause
To better understand the impact of the Enclave Clause, it is useful to
review its history, as it lends some support to the federalism thrust of
Utah’s argument. On August 18, 1787, delegates to the Constitutional
Convention responded to the soldiers’ actions in Philadelphia by
attempting to both establish a separate home for the federal government
and meanwhile assuage the individual states that their sovereignty would
not be violated. James Madison led the cause by proposing that Congress
be given the power “[t]o exercise exclusively Legislative authority at the
seat of the General Government, and over a district around the same, not
exceeding [ten] square miles, the Consent of the Legislature of the State
or States comprising the same, being first obtained.”91 Madison also
proposed that the Convention “authorize the Executive to procure and
hold for the use of the U.S. landed property for the erection of Forts,
Magazines, and other necessary buildings.”92

88. Id.
89. Herrod, supra note 65, at 7.
90. See Utah Enabling Act, 28 Stat. 107 (1894).
91. James
Madison,
Madison
Debates
(Aug.
18,
1787),
available
at
http://Avalon.law.yale.edu/ 18th_century/debates_818.asp. The Convention would decide on the size
of ten square miles at a later date, the size which was incorporated into the Enclave Clause. U.S.
CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 17.
92. Id.
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The first of these powers was proposed in an effort to establish a
central, geographical seat of authority for the nation that was to be free
from the will of any individual state.93 Ultimately, Washington, D.C.,
was formed, and Congress obtained exclusive authority over the
District.94 The Supreme Court affirmed Congress’s exclusive authority
over the District soon after ratification.95 The second of these powers
was proposed in an effort to extend the general legislative power to
purchases of federal installations within the different states, though it
was unclear whether federal legislative authority would supersede that of
the state on these properties.96 Both proposals became part of what is
now known as the “Enclave Clause,” which gives Congress the
enumerated power
[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such
District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of
Particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of
the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority
over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State
in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines,
97
Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings.

The final draft of the Enclave Clause limited the location and size of
the district, but the most important limitation was that of consent—it
ensured that any land conveyance for the district occur “by Cession” of
each affected state, and that any other land purchase occur “by the
Consent of the [state] Legislature.”98 Through an analysis of the
constitutional debates and convention history, constitutional scholar
Robert Natelson noted that these two limitations (location and size/
cession or consent) exemplify the emphasis the founders placed on
protecting federalism in drafting the Enclave Clause.99

93. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 151–52 (Alexander Hamilton) (Kessinger Publishing
2004); for a discussion of events that likely fomented this desire, see supra Part I.
94. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
95. Reily v. Lamar, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 344, 354–55 (1805).
96. See Robert G. Natelson, Federal Land Retention and the Constitution’s Property Clause:
The Original Understanding, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 327, 346–47 & nn.96–97 (2005).
97. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
98. Id.
99. Natelson, supra note 96, at 346–57.
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1. Place- and size-limitation requirement
During the Constitutional Convention debates, several delegates
expressed their concern over establishing any geographical district to
seat the central government.100 Not only were delegates concerned over
jurisdictional problems, but they also worried it might upset the
federalism balance—namely, that it would give a “provincial tincture to
[the National] deliberations.”101 Other delegates generally agreed that
creating the District would prevent favoritism in New York or
Philadelphia and would “better effectuate the fiduciary ideal of
impartiality.”102
Different sizes for the District were suggested, but to assuage
concerns, those in favor of a central geographical District ensured that
the District would be limited in size. During the Virginia ratifying
convention, James Madison even ensured the representatives that the
District “cannot exceed ten miles square.”103 This concern was echoed in
ratifying conventions throughout the several states.104 Convinced that the
size limitation had assuaged any fears of an overbearing federal
government, Madison claimed that “[t]he extent of this federal district is
sufficiently circumscribed to satisfy every jealousy of an opposite
nature.”105
Although these limitations may seem minor given the reach of
Congress’s other enumerated powers,106 their symbolic importance is
without question. Not only would the national government be separate in
power and in kind from that of the states, but the federal government
would also have its own separate geographic location over which it
would exercise sovereign power. But this power would not extend
beyond a small, ceded plot of land for the District, nor would it extend to
any federal enclave other than “needful Buildings.”107 These
100. Id. at 353–55.
101. Col. Mason, Madison Debates (July 26, 1787), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/
18th_century/debates_726.asp.
102. Natelson, supra note 96, at 350.
103. James Madison, Virginia Ratifying Debates, 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 432.
104. Natelson, supra note 96, at 354 n.128.
105. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 209 (James Madison) (Terrence Ball ed., 2003).
106. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
107. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
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circumscribed limits not only act as a protection from federal
encroachment onto state land,108 but they also symbolize the distinct
separation between state and federal power.
2. State-consent requirement
Although the location and size limitations were important
restrictions, even more essential to the successful passage of the Enclave
Clause was its consent requirement for land purchases. The Framers
were concerned that extensive land holdings by the federal government
within the states “might be made use of to enslave any particular State by
buying up its territory, and that the strongholds proposed would be a
means of awing the State into an undue obedience to the [General]
Government.”109 To ensure that this power was not abused, “after the
word ‘purchased’ the words ‘by the consent of the Legislature of the
State’” were added.110
James Madison also noted the important federalism implication
inherent in control over these installations: “The public money expended
on such places and the public property deposited in them, requires that
they should be exempt from the authority of the particular State.”111 As
with the size limitation, the consent requirement (or concession, in the
case of creating the District) was also an important theme in the state
ratifying debates.112 In fact, many state convention representatives
understood that this limitation was so reaching that individual states
could place jurisdictional conditions on any cession of land.113
The state consent requirement was not only a practical limitation, but
also a symbolic limitation on federal authority. It was the states that
would be tasked with ceding land for a national seat of government. It
was the states that would have to agree to cede land purchased for

108. Natelson, supra note 95, at 353–54 (noting in particular that an overarching concern of
the Anti-Federalists was that the Enclave Clause “might be abused” and that the Federal Government
might use the enclaves, particularly military ones, “to intimidate the states and thereby undermine
the independence of state governments from undue federal influence.”).
109. Mr. Gerry, Madison Debates (Sept. 5, 1787), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/
18th_century/debates_905.asp.
110. 5 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 511 (Mr. King).
111. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 209 (James Madison) (Terrence Ball ed., 2003).
112. Natelson, supra note 96, at 355 n.132.
113. Id.
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federal installations and “needful Buildings,”114 and it was the states that
would set the limits on federal jurisdiction within these enclaves. As with
the location and size limitations, the state consent requirement is another
example of the federalism implications inherent in the text and history of
the Enclave Clause.115
C. Utah’s Enabling Act and the Argument Against Complete
Jurisdictional Cession
In light of the federalism underpinnings inherent in the text and
history of the Enclave Clause, the impetus behind Utah’s current public
lands debate and Enclave Clause arguments begins to become clear. In
order to assess the validity of the state’s arguments, however, one must
analyze the instrument through which Utah originally ceded its lands to
the federal government—the Utah Enabling Act.
1. An understanding of the UEA
On July 16, 1894, after much anticipation, and some political and
religious compromise,116 President Grover Cleveland signed Utah’s
Enabling Act into law.117 Almost six months later, on January 4, 1896,
President Cleveland welcomed Utah as a state into the Union by
proclamation, thus taking the final step required for Utah statehood.118
Although no legal challenges to the Act arose during Utah’s early years,
the state’s current success depends heavily on connecting the Enclave
Clause and Utah’s interpretation of the Enabling Act—specifically that
the federal government has failed in its contractual obligations to sell off
its land.
As with the enabling acts used in many other admitted states, Utah’s

114. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
115. See also C. Perry Patterson, The Relation of the Federal Government to the Territories
and the States in Landholding, 28 TEX. L. REV. 43, 43 (1949) (“[The landholding relation] is one of
the most basic foundations of our federalism, if, indeed, it is not the corner stone.”); cf. Allan
Erbsen, Constitutional Spaces, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1168, 1237 (2011) (“[T]he Enclave Clause does
not bar Congress from taking land from an unconsenting state by eminent domain.”)
116. For a discussion of the role of polygamy in Utah’s statehood prospects, see ORSON F.
WHITNEY, POPULAR HISTORY OF UTAH 332–46 (1916).
117. Utah to Become a State, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1894, at 9, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=F30811FC3C5415738DDDA10994
DF405B8485F0D3.
118. WHITNEY, supra note 116, at 506.
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Enabling Act set very specific conditions on Utah’s admission into the
Union. It limited state and federal action in four important ways: (1)
Utah ceded all “right and title” to unappropriated public lands to the
United States119; (2) the state had to tax all landowners equally and could
not tax federal property120; (3) some of these public lands would be
given back to the state for state government and public buildings121; and
(4) five percent of the proceeds from the sale of excess public lands
would go back to the state for a common school trust fund. Utah’s public
lands arguments hinge primarily on the first and fourth of these
provisions.122
2. Right and title
One common argument made by Utah lawmakers is that, although
Utah conceded all “right and title” to the unappropriated public lands in
the state, it did not concede its jurisdiction over those lands.123 Section 3
of the UEA concedes all right, title, and jurisdiction over Indian lands
within the state, but for all other public lands, the state conceded only
“right and title.” Utah lawmakers here rely on the canon of construction
expressio unius to claim that Congress intended to exclude such
jurisdiction as it relates to the state’s public lands.
State Representative Chris Herrod has argued that this distinction

119. Utah Enabling Act, 28 Stat. 107 § 3 (1894).
[T]he people inhabiting said proposed State do agree and declare that they forever
disclaim all right and title to the unappropriated public lands lying within the boundaries
thereof; and to all lands lying within said limits owned or held by any Indian or Indian
tribes; and that until the title thereto shall have been extinguished by the United States,
the same shall be and remain subject to the disposition of the United States, and said
Indian lands shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of
the United States . . . . Id.
120. Id. (“[T]he lands belonging to citizens of the United States residing without the said State
shall never be taxed at a higher rate than the lands belonging to residents thereof; that no taxes shall
be imposed by the State on lands or property therein belonging to or which may hereafter be
purchased by the United States or reserved for its use.”).
121. Id. § 7 (Large sections of unappropriated public lands would be provided to “erect[]
public buildings, at the capital of said State, when permanently located, for legislative, executive,
and judicial purposes.”).
122. Id. § 9 (“That five per centum of the proceeds of the sales of public lands lying within
said State, which shall be sold by the United States subsequent to the admission of said State into the
Union, after deducting all the expenses incident to the same, shall be paid to the said State, to be
used as a permanent fund, the interest of which only shall be expended for the support of the
common schools within said State.”).
123. Id. § 3.
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between “right and title” and jurisdiction is key to understanding the
chain of title underlying Utah lands. In a recent article to the American
Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), he argued:
Utah did not give up its claim of jurisdiction or sovereignty. By
forfeiting ‘right and title,’ Utah simply forfeited claim of ownership,
which was needed to give clean title to the land. This is often referred
to as ‘proprietary’ title and is the same type of ownership that any
property owner holds. In contrast, Utah gave up ‘right, title, and
jurisdiction’ over sovereign Indian lands within its boundaries.124

Representative Herrod’s position is that the Enabling Act was but a
medium through which the United States would hold the land
temporarily to obtain “clean title” and wash away any lasting notion of
territorial sovereignty. The federal government in this stage would be
“more of a proprietor.”125 In turn, the excess public lands not dedicated
to other purposes as outlined in the Act would eventually be sold back to
the state or privatized, with five percent of the proceeds going to Utah’s
common school trust fund. The federal government could purchase these
lands “by the Consent of the Legislature”126—as required by the Enclave
Clause—but if the lands were not sold off as agreed to, Utah’s position is
that the federal government no longer has jurisdiction, and its right and
title to the lands should be revoked because its right to hold title of the
lands was only temporary.
Instead, Utah lawmakers argue, the state may exercise its power of
eminent domain over these excess public lands, sell or purchase them,
and retain the five percent in its trust fund coffers.127 Although this
argument is novel and unique to Utah because of the text of the UEA, the
state’s argument must overcome a variety of obstacles: not only will the
Equal Footing Doctrine and the Property Clause pose significant barriers,
but the state will also face mounting political and environmental
opposition to its cause.

124. Herrod, supra note 63, at 6.
125. Phil Taylor, U.S. Not ‘Sovereign’ Over Federal Lands, Utah GOP Senate Candidate
Says, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/07/02/02greenwire-us-notsovereign-over-federal-lands-utah-gop-s-30438.html?pagewanted=all (quoting now-Senator Mike
Lee).
126. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
127. See Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875) for a discussion of the underpinnings of
the federal-state eminent domain power. See also Note, The Power of a State to Condemn Land for a
Federal Park, 44 YALE L.J. 1458 (1935).
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But while the text and history of the UEA and the Enclave Clause
seem to strongly support Utah’s authority to regain control of these
contested lands, over 200 years of Supreme Court decisions have reshaped public lands issues. As such, it is important to analyze Utah’s
potential argument in light of the Court’s Enclave Clause jurisprudence
(collectively, the limitations imposed by the Property Clause,128 the
federal government’s eminent domain authority,129 and the “Equal
Footing doctrine,”130) as discussed below.
D. Challenges Posed by the Property Clause
First, the success of Utah’s Enclave Clause argument depends
heavily on the extent of federal power under the Constitution’s Property
Clause.
1. The Property Clause: Text and structure
The federalism implications inherent in the text and structure of the
Property Clause might provide support for Utah’s defense of a Property
Clause challenge, which is essentially that the United States holds a mere
“proprietorship”131 over the land. If the land in Utah were still under
control as federal property, then “Congress has the same power over it as
over any other property belonging to the United States; and this power is
vested in Congress without limitation . . . .”132 Utah lawmakers argue,
however, that the state’s land in question is still retained only in an
escrow-type holding, even though the United States is acting as both a
broker and contracting party. After forming the new state, “the power of
the United States over these lands, as property, was to cease.”133 To
understand the extent of federal control over these specific lands, a more
thorough analysis of the text of the Property Clause is warranted.
The Constitution’s Property Clause gives Congress several powers,
including the power “to dispose of and make all needful Rules and
128. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17; see infra Part III.D.
129. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1; see infra Part III.E.
130. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2; see infra Part III.F.
131. As discussed, this refers to lands still within federal purview, but not yet “dispose[d]” of
in accord with the UEA’s mandate that these lands “shall be sold.” Utah Enabling Act, 28 Stat. 107
§§ 6, 9 (1894).
132. United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. 526, 537 (1840). See also Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426
U.S. 529, 539 (1976).
133. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 224 (1845).
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Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the
United
States;
and
nothing
in
this
Constitution
shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or
of any particular State.”134
On its face, the Property Clause grants a host of powers to
Congress—if it owns the land, it can “dispose of” it and “make
all
needful Rules and Regulations” concerning it.135 Furthermore, no state
action can “Prejudice any [of] these Claims.”136 But Congress’s
authority under this clause applies only to “[t]erritory and other Property
belonging to the United States.”137 Thus, if the land does not belong to
the United States, because the United States had disposed of the land in
forming a new state under Article IV, Section 3, Clause 1, then the
federal government’s authority does not reach, unless it purchases the
land or exercises its authority of eminent domain.
The structure of the Property Clause within Section 3 lends support
for a more state-protective interpretation of the Clause. There are only
two clauses in Section 3—the first sets forth the procedure of forming
new states,138 and the second (the Property Clause) discusses the
procedure for disposing those lands. When read together with the first
clause, the Property Clause can be seen as a call to Congress to dispose
of lands it uses to form new states. This interpretation is strengthened by
yet another structural argument: the Property Clause is located in Article
IV, which contains a host of rights protective of the states. Unlike
Congress’s authority to “purchase” lands under the Enclave Clause,
which is part of Congress’s enumerated powers in Article I, the Property
Clause cannot be read as an enumerated power but instead (for disposal
purposes) as a procedural limitation when it has decided to form a new
state from its existent territorial holdings.

134. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 (“New States may be admitted by the Congress into this
Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any
State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the
Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.”).
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2. The Property Clause after Kleppe
Despite these potential insights, the Supreme Court has interpreted
the Property Clause as a broad grant of authority to Congress. But if the
Property Clause is read in light of the Enclave Clause as the Court
interprets the UEA, however, this view may change, since the Court will
be examining the Property Clause through a new lens—a contractual
claim in an enabling act.
After Congress passed FLPMA in 1976, it completely reversed
direction in its policy to dispose of federal lands and instead “formally
declared that its ‘ownership’ of public domain lands was permanent”
through an exercise of its power under the Property Clause.139 Utah
could argue here that this decision stands as an implicit recognition that
congressional ownership was not “permanent,” and instead the standing
policy since the Founding was to “dispose” of these lands (which is in
line with the structural arguments noted above). However, the Supreme
Court paved the way for a more expansive exercise of federal power
when, months earlier, it decided Kleppe v. New Mexico.140
At issue in Kleppe was an action by the New Mexico Livestock
Board (NMLB) when it took and sold nineteen unbranded burros from
BLM land. The United States contested the NMLB’s authority on the
lands and argued that the Wild and Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act
protected the burros from “capture, branding, harassment, or death.”141
The Court held for the United States and gave the Property Clause a
broad reading. Not only could Congress clearly manage and sell federal
lands, but also when state action contradicts this authority, congressional
legislation “necessarily overrides conflicting state laws under the
Supremacy Clause.”142 The Court’s preemptive view of federal authority
on these lands struck yet another blow to supporters of federalism and
the Sagebrush Rebellion.143 In fact, the language used by the Court was
so broad as to seemingly undercut any hope that the Enclave Clause
might pose for public lands movements—the Court held that the federal

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Landever, supra note 34, at 597.
426 U.S. 529 (1976).
Pub. L. 92–195 (1971).
Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 543.
See supra Part II.A.

1023

10-DRISCOLL.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/8/2013 2:42 PM

2012

government possessed “complete power,”144 “plenary power,”145 “police
power,”146 “power . . . without limitations,”147 and “the powers . . . of a
legislature over the public domain.’”148
The Kleppe Court also discussed the Enclave Clause, and noted that
while the acquisition of jurisdiction over lands within a state is the
impetus of the Enclave Clause, it “has nothing to do with Congress’
powers under the Property Clause.”149 Absent such jurisdiction,
Congress may still legislate with respect to its lands under its Property
Clause authority.150 The implication of this distinction is that, to legislate
under the Enclave Clause, Utah lawmakers must make a clear case for
the application of the Enclave Clause and successfully argue that the
federal government’s claim to the contested lands is invalid. Otherwise,
the federal government’s exercise of authority under the Property Clause
will necessarily invalidate the state’s exercise of eminent domain.
3. Looking to the future: Commerce Clause federalism and the Enclave
Clause
What makes the Kleppe decision so intriguing in the context of statefederal relations is that it was decided just a week before the Supreme
Court’s decision in National League of Cities v. Usery.151 The Court’s
decision in National League of Cities empowered states because the
Court refused to extend Congress’s Commerce Clause authority under
the Fair Labor Standards Act, which required states to apply minimumwage and maximum-hour requirements.152 Although the Court’s
decision in Garcia v. San Metropolitan Transit Authority153 marked a
clear change in direction for the Court from this position, the wake left

144. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 540.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 539.
148. Id. at 540; see WILKINSON, supra note 27, at 11 (for a broader discussion of the expanded
property clause in Kleppe.
149. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 542.
150. Id.
151. 426 U.S. 833 (1976); for a much more thorough discussion of the possibilities of
advancing the cause of federalism through the public lands debate, see Landever, supra note 34, at
600.
152. National League of Cities, 426 U.S at 855.
153. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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behind after its decisions in United States v. Morrison154 and United
States v. Lopez155 supports the prospective Utah case in terms of general
support for federalism ideals.
Although these cases touched on federalism through an analysis of
the Commerce Clause authority, Utah lawmakers are undoubtedly
hopeful that the Court will extend its federalism ideals through its
analysis of the Enclave/Property Clause authority. A glimmer of hope for
this future outcome came in the Court’s public lands decision in Utah
Division of State Lands v. United States.156 Although this was an “equal
footing” case and not an Enclave Clause case, the Court again
emphasized the notion that Congress’s policy with respect to the
government’s large land holdings was to “hold[] this land for the
ultimate benefit of the future states.”157 Only in “exceptional instances”
would it “defeat[] the future States’ title to the lands under navigable
water.”158 A narrow reading may imply that the Court’s discussion only
applies to the land “under navigable water,” but at the very least, the
Court’s decision emphasizes that Congress must act with a “sufficiently
plain” intent to defeat its prior policy of divestment.159 Given the wake
effectuated by the Morrison and Lopez decisions, supporters are hopeful
that the tide of federalism will work in their favor with public lands
concerns as well.
The hope for this position has increased following a couple of recent
Supreme Court decisions. In Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, the
Supreme Court was asked to determine whether a congressional Apology
Resolution in any way limited the state’s sovereign authority to alienate
state lands that were being held in a public trust.160 In 1893, Congress
annexed the Hawaiian Islands and claimed sovereignty over the islands
by passing the Newlands Resolution; Congress returned title to the
islands to Hawaii in the 1959 Admission Act, under the condition that
title be held in a public trust.161 The Supreme Court held that the 1993
Apology Resolution in no way diminished this state authority because

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

529 U.S. 598 (2000).
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
482 U.S. 193 (1987).
Id. at 209.
Id.
Id. at 203.
556 U.S. 163 (2009).
Id. at 166–69.
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“[t]he consequences of admission are instantaneous, and it ignores the
uniquely sovereign character of that event . . . to suggest that subsequent
events somehow can diminish what has already been bestowed.”162 The
Court also extended this notion in broad strokes and held that “[this]
proposition applies a fortiori where virtually all of the State’s public
lands—not just its submerged ones—are at stake.”163 If the Court
extends this principle, especially under the Equal Footing Doctrine, to
the lands at issue in Utah, the state’s case becomes stronger yet.
E. Eminent Domain and Separating Validly Held from Invalidly Held
Lands
The second major challenge to Utah’s case will likely be to Utah’s
eminent domain claim. Utah’s argument here is, essentially, that the
federal government has not properly divested itself of the state’s public
lands in accordance with the UEA but has instead retained them
invalidly. Because the federal government may obtain land both under
the Enclave Clause and by transfer or through eminent domain, this
section of the Comment will make clear that the state’s argument
pertains to a different, third kind of landholding that is invalid—those
lands which have been retained but not validly obtained. To do so, it
addresses each category of land, in turn.
1. Lands validly obtained under the Enclave Clause
The first legal avenue through which the federal government can
acquire land is state consent under the Enclave Clause although states
can place conditions on any such transfer of land. In Fort Leavenworth
Railroad Co. v. Lowe, for example, the state of Kansas retained the right
to tax the Fort Leavenworth Military Reservation when it ceded the land
to the federal government as a federal enclave.164 When the state
attempted to levy property taxes against installations on the reservation,
the railroad company objected.165 In its decision, the Court articulated
two important points about state transfers of lands under the Enclave
Clause—first, states may decide to cede only conditional jurisdiction
over the land; second, these conditions cannot run counter to the
162.
163.
164.
165.
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114 U.S. 525, 528 (1885).
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purposes the enclaves are suited to fulfill.166 States might also choose to
transfer the power of exclusive jurisdiction, which would bar any state
restriction of federal authority.167
The Court ultimately held that Kansas could tax the railroad that ran
across the federal property, but the state could not exercise its sovereign
authority—such as its taxing authority—over federal installations, like
the Ft. Leavenworth military base.168 This is because it “would destroy
or impair [the government’s] effective use for the purposes
designed.”169 The Court also articulated the structural reason that
Congress is given this power of “exclusive Legislation”170 over federal
enclaves to make sure that these enclaves, or “places on which the
security of the entire Union may depend,” would not “be in any degree
dependent on a particular member of it.”171
Although the holding in Fort Leavenworth greatly restricts the
exercise of state authority on these lands, the Court did emphasize that
the federal government could only construct truly “needful Buildings” on
the land.172 If the land is used for other purposes, then “the legislative
power of the state over the places acquired will be as full and complete
as over any other places within her limits.”173 In fact, the Court reiterated
the validity of the state exercise of eminent domain authority on federal
land and stressed that the federal government must obtain consent if it
desires to purchase state land.174 If a state refuses to consent, the land
166. Id. at 539.
167. Id. at 542.
168. Id. at 541–42.
169. Id. at 539.
170. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. For a discussion of the distinction between “exclusive
jurisdiction” and “exclusive Legislation” (the terminology of the Enclave Clause), see David E.
Engdahl, State and Federal Power over Federal Property, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 283, 288–90, nn.9–15
(1976).
171. Fort Leavenworth, 114 U.S. at 530.
172. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
173. Fort Leavenworth, 114 U.S. at 539; see also Murphy v. Love, 249 F.2d 783, 786 (10th
Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 958 (1958) (discussing the validity of state taxation on federal
lands, though not on federal installations). Congress has also validated this exercise. 4 U.S.C. § 105
(2006) (preventing individuals from claiming a tax exemption because the purchase was made on
federal land).
174. Fort Leavenworth, 114 U.S. at 531–32. It is important to note that the Fort Leavenworth
decision is read generally as a strong limitation on state sovereignty and jurisdiction. Because the
Court reiterated that the federal government had the power of eminent domain and clear sovereign
authority for its purposes within federal enclaves harbored within the states, this understanding is
warranted. However, the case should not be read as a complete destruction of state sovereignty over
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retained by the federal government would still be open to valid exercises
of state authority—including that of eminent domain:
Where lands are acquired without such consent, the possession of the
United States, unless political jurisdiction be ceded to them in some
other way, is simply that of an ordinary proprietor. The property in
that case, unless used as a means to carry out the purposes of the
government, is subject to the legislative authority and control of the
states equally with the property of private individuals.175

However far this authority may extend, the Supremacy Clause176
prevents states from abusing their jurisdictional authority, but they may
reserve and exercise concurrent jurisdiction over these lands.177

2. Lands validly obtained by transfer or by eminent domain
One question that remained unanswered after Fort Leavenworth was
the extent of state authority over lands within this second category—
lands validly obtained by the federal government through means other
than the Enclave Clause, such as eminent domain. In Collins v. Yosemite
Park & Curry Co., the Supreme Court initially answered this question
flexibly in a dispute over the state exercise of jurisdiction in Yosemite
National Park.178 In 1920, the state of California transferred the
Yosemite Valley to the federal government but qualified the cession by
retaining the authority to tax.179 The Court noted that in these situations,

public lands. By setting a clear line that the federal government could only exercise this authority
over “needful Buildings” and terminating federal authority over land not acquired in accordance
with the Enclave Clause, this Comment argues that it should also be read to emphasize the vitality of
the Enclave Clause.
175. Fort Leavenworth, 114 U.S. at 531 (emphasis added). It is worth noting here that this
very language was alluded to by Senator Mike Lee when discussing Utah’s exercise of eminent
domain under the Enclave Clause. See Taylor, supra note 125.
176. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
177. E.g., James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937); Bd. of Supervisors v. United
States, 408 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. Va. 1976), dismissed, 551 F.2d 305 (4th Cir. 1977) (both cases
discussing the potential for overlapping jurisdictional coverage where the state exercise of
jurisdiction does not impede the federal government’s purpose for acquiring the land). For a more
recent example of concurrent jurisdiction, see Swords to Plowshares v. Kemp, 423 F. Supp. 2d 1031
(N.D. Cal. 2005).
178. 304 U.S. 518 (1938); see also James, 302 U.S. at 134.
179. Collins, 304 U.S. at 530.
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“[t]he States of the Union and the National Government may make
mutually satisfactory arrangements as to jurisdiction of territory within
their borders and thus in a most effective way, cooperatively adjust
problems flowing from our dual system of government.”180 Like under
the Enclave Clause, here states and the federal government can together
decide how to divide jurisdiction over the land. Many states opt to cede
exclusive jurisdiction because of the sheer cost of policing and
maintaining certain public lands.181
But where a state has not ceded land and instead the federal
government has acquired it by eminent domain, for example, a shared
jurisdictional arrangement may not be desired or agreeable. In these
instances, as noted in Kleppe, the federal government possesses
“complete power” over these lands under the Property Clause.182 In a
separate case particularly pertinent to Utah’s argument, Utah Power &
Light Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the federal
government possesses broad authority over federal land within the states
(including, here, BLM land). Furthermore, these powers supersede any
eminent domain claim by a state.183 In Utah Power & Light Co., state
officials authorized the construction of a power plant on a federal forest
reservation without the consent of the federal government.184 The Court
held that state consent was not sufficient authorization, even if the land
was “not used or needed for a fort or other governmental purpose of the
United States” under the Enclave Clause.185 This is because Congress
can obtain land through means other than the Enclave Clause, including
under the Property Clause.186
In order to survive the holding in Utah Power & Light Co., Utah
must make a new argument here: instead of merely arguing that the
federal government did not obtain the contested lands under the Enclave
Clause, it must argue that the federal government did not obtain the lands

180. Id. at 528.
181. For example, Nevada ceded jurisdiction over the Lake Mead National Recreation Area
because of budgetary concerns over maintenance and policing of the area. See Charles F. Wilkinson,
The Field of Public Land Law: Some Connecting Threads and Future Directions, 1 PUB. LAND L.
REV. 1 (1980).
182. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 540 (1976).
183. Utah Power and & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389 (1917).
184. Id. at 399.
185. Id. at 403–04.
186. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
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by any valid means. This avenue—challenging the federal government’s
title to the land under the UEA—is the only way to overcome the federal
government’s broad authority under the Property Clause. Otherwise, the
Court will hold for the federal government, as in Utah Power & Light
Co., that “only through [congressional action] can rights in lands
belonging to the United States be acquired.”187 In that case, the Court
also made clear that “state laws, including those relating to the exercise
of the power of eminent domain, have no bearing upon a controversy
such as is here presented, save as they may have been adopted or made
applicable by Congress.”188 In light of this outcome, commentators have
generally concluded that Utah’s exercise of eminent domain on these
lands would be futile.189 That is, of course, unless Utah is able to make
clear that is argument pertains only to a third, and distinct category of
lands.
3. Third—and finally—lands retained but not validly divested
Given the extensive reach of federal authority on its land holdings as
discussed above, in order for Utah to succeed, it must make clear that its
claim relates to a different category of land altogether. The final question
that remains unanswered, and which Utah is likely to pose to the court, is
the extent of federal authority over lands that have been retained by the
federal government since a state’s admission into the Union but that have
never been validly divested under a state’s enabling act or otherwise
legally acquired. The Court has yet to address this question, since
previous cases never hinged on such a condition. The state of Utah will
almost certainly argue that federal authority over the vast majority of its
public lands holdings within the state is invalid because it was supposed
to divest itself of these lands in accordance with the UEA.190

187. Utah Power & Light Co., 243 U.S. at 404.
188. Id. at 405.
189. See, e.g., Scott Streater, Utah Eminent Domain Law More than a “Message Bill,” NY
TIMES, Apr. 2, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/04/01/01greenwire-utah-eminent-domainlaw-more-than-a-message-bi-25839.html?pagewanted=all; Nicholas Riccardi, In Utah, A Move to
Sieze Federal Land, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/mar/03/nation/la-nautah-domain3-2010mar03; Eugene Volokh, “Can a State Take Federal Land by Eminent Domain?”
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 29, 2010: 3:57 P.M.), http://volokh.com/2010/03/29/can-a-state-takefederal-land-by-eminent-domain/.
190. Utah Enabling Act, 28 Stat. 107 §§ 3, 9 (1894).
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Although Utah Power & Light Co. clearly established that a state
may not exercise its power of eminent domain over public lands obtained
by valid congressional and executive action,191 large percentages of land
in Utah (excluding lands such as national parks, which the federal
government has properly obtained) are still being retained by the federal
government and have never been sold off as required under the UEA.192
These are the lands that Utah lawmakers are specifically concerned
about. Since the federal government has still not divested itself of these
lands, Utah has lost out on millions of dollars in property taxes and in
access to natural resources.193
The Supreme Court has clearly held that the federal government
possesses broad powers over land it has obtained under the Enclave
Clause and through other valid congressional or executive action, so
Utah must successfully distinguish its claim and argue that the federal
government has failed to divest itself of these lands under the UEA and
has not otherwise validly obtained them. Utah must make the case that,
after more than a century, Congress is still bound by the conditions it
agreed to in 1894.
F. Pollard, Equal Footing, the Supremacy Clause, and Some Promising
Dicta
Third, and finally, the federal government will likely challenge
Utah’s interpretation of, and argument concerning, the Equal Footing
Doctrine. Though Utah will clearly rely on the Enclave Clause in support
of its position, it also seems poised to provide a renewed interpretation of
this doctrine despite a forceful legislative note against such a position.194
The argument concerning the Equal Footing Doctrine, as utilized by
public lands movements in the past,195 can be summarized as follows:
when a new state is admitted to the Union, it must be given the same
legal and political rights as the preexisting states; in terms of authority
over public lands, this means that states must be granted equal authority

191. 243 U.S. at 405.
192. The state of Utah has acknowledged the validity of a number of federal land holdings in
its most recent bill, which excludes these lands from its purview, including national parks and
national monuments. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63L-6-101 to 104 (2010) (West 2012).
193. See Herrod, supra note 63, at 7; UTAH STATE OFFICE OF EDUCATION, SCHOOL LAND
TRUST (2012), available at http://www.schoollandtrust.org/school-trust/school-fund/.
194. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-503.5 (West 2010).
195. See supra Parts II.A–B.
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over public lands within their state boundaries, though some see the
doctrine as limited to land underlying waterways.196 Support for this
view stems from the 1845 Supreme Court decision of Pollard v.
Hagan197 in which the Court applied the Equal Footing Doctrine to
reject federal ownership of land underlying waterways.198 The Court’s
very broad dicta are often cited as support for the position that Pollard is
also applicable to dry land. In fact, this position has been consistently
held by states’ rights activists protesting federal control over public
lands.199
Under dispute in Pollard was a stretch of land underlying the Mobile
River in Alabama. The two parties to the dispute had been granted
conflicting deeds—one from the federal government and one from the
state. The Alabama Supreme Court validated the defendants’ deed to the
land, which was granted to them by the state.200 The Plaintiffs appealed,
contending that their title to the land was valid because it had been
granted to them by patent, which had been affirmed by Congress.201 The
Supreme Court affirmed the Alabama Supreme Court’s decision and
validated the defendants’ deed, holding that the federal government did
not possess sovereign power over the land underlying the Mobile River
in Alabama.202 Instead, the Court held that the land was ceded only
temporarily to the Union before Alabama became a state, and the federal
government’s exercise of municipal sovereignty over that land ceased
following Alabama’s transition into statehood.203 Although the Court
recognized that the federal government had the power to regulate
interstate waterways under its Commerce Clause authority,204 it also held

196. For states admitted to the Union after the country’s formation, the Court has held (as it
did in Pollard), that such an interpretation applied to the land underlying waterways. However, the
Equal Footing Doctrine does not necessarily encompass such a narrow view—the Supreme Court
has also held that it acts as a limit on Congress from requiring anything in a state’s enabling act that
would limit its future sovereignty as a state, including the power to change the location of a state
capital. See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911).
197. 44 U.S. 212 (1845).
198. Id. at 230.
199. This includes the “Sagebrush Rebellion” and the “County Supremacists;” see Parts II.A
and II.C.
200. Pollard, 44 U.S. at 230.
201. Id. at 221.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 229–30.
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that the federal government’s power did not extend to ownership of the
land, which had never been ceded to the United States.205 Exercising
such overreaching sovereignty over these lands, the Court held, would be
“repugnant to the Constitution.”206
Because the land at issue in the case was only the land underlying the
river, some read Pollard narrowly as an express limit on federal
ownership of land underlying waterways.207 Some subsequent Supreme
Court precedent also seems to support this view, though the doctrine has
in certain instances been applied more generally as well.208
Notwithstanding, there is a strong argument to be made for its
applicability to federal ownership of public lands generally. In fact, one
scholar argues that “it is the very generality of the Court’s chosen
language and analysis that indicates that the Court did not view the
power over submerged lands as different from the power over other lands
held temporarily by the federal government.”209
States’ rights supporters, including numerous Utah legislators, rely
on a key phrase from the Pollard decision in their arguments: “We think
a proper examination of this subject will show, that the United States
never held any municipal sovereignty, jurisdiction, or right of soil in and
to the territory, of which Alabama or any of the new states were formed;
except for temporary purposes.”210 The fact that the Court did not
specifically limit its holding to lands under waterways, coupled with the
fact that the Court very openly disavowed the exercise of federal
“municipal sovereignty” and “jurisdiction” over lands ceded, suggests
that the holding might extend to dry land. In relation to the Court’s
specific Enclave Clause jurisprudence, this is of extreme significance; if
the United States could hold right in the soil only for “temporary
purposes,”211 it would seem to suggest that the UEA should be read in a
similar light, which implies that the federal government should have
205. Id. at 224; see also Part III.F (Utah’s own case against the federal government is likely to
touch on whether or not the land and exclusive jurisdiction over it was ever ceded to the federal
government).
206. Pollard, 44 U.S. at 224.
207. Conable, supra note 35, at 1281.
208. For another example of the Court applying the doctrine to land underlying waterways, see
Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193 (1987). For a case involving other state
lands, see Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911).
209. Landever, supra note 34, at 575.
210. 44 U.S. at 221.
211. Id.
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divested itself of its non-committed public lands soon after the UEA was
enacted.
But while Pollard can be read to support Utah’s position, subsequent
Supreme Court precedent tends to undercut such support. For example,
the Supreme Court has held that the Equal Footing Doctrine only
guarantees political equality, specifically “[e]quality of constitutional
right and power.”212 Because all of the western states were admitted
under similar circumstances and given equal political rights then, the
argument goes, the large areas of public lands held by the federal
government are rightly held. Some cite this political equality argument as
fundamental to the doctrine and discount a more extensive application of
Pollard.213 However, Utah could rightly argue that by holding nearly
sixty percent or more of the land within the state’s boundaries,214 the
federal government retains such exacting control over the land and its
resources that it limits the state’s ability to function as a political
equivalent when the state’s economy relies so heavily on the extraction
of natural resources. Because the UEA serves as a binding contract
between Utah and the federal government, this “political equality”
argument would be only secondary to the United States’ fulfillment of its
promises to Utah. In addition, an understanding of the concept of limited
landholdings by the federal government through an analysis of the
Enclave Clause215 supports the notion that these lands should be
divested—especially when the Property Clause is seen as a call to the
federal government to do so in the process of forming new states.216
Scholars note that whatever reading is given to Pollard, it must be
read carefully so as not to view the Supreme Court’s holding as an
unlimited grant of federal authority on public lands.217 This is especially
so in light of the Pollard Court’s statement concerning state cession of
land:
The object of all the parties to these contracts of cession, was to convert

212. Escanaba and Lake Mich. Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 107 U.S. 678, 689 (1883).
213. Alexander H. Southwell, The County Supremacy Movement: The Federalism
Implications of a 1990s States’ Rights Battle, 32 GONZ. L. REV. 417, 460–66 (1997).
214. The Open West, Owned by the Federal Government, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/03/23/us/western-land-owned-by-the-federalgovernment.html.
215. See Part III.B.1.
216. See id.
217. Landever, supra note 33.
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the land into money for the payment of the debt, and to erect new states
over the territory thus ceded; and as soon as these purposes could be
accomplished, the power of the United States over these lands, as
property, was to cease.218

At bottom, Pollard still stands as a notable limitation on federal Enclave
Clause authority.
IV. CONCLUSION: POSSIBLE AVENUES FOR SUCCESS
Although Supreme Court jurisprudence in terms of the Enclave
Clause, the Equal Footing Doctrine, and the Property Clause seems
mixed, the hope these provisions provide for Utah’s argument in terms of
the UEA is nonetheless significant. First, the history of the Enclave
Clause demonstrates the importance of limited federal landholdings, and
the text of the Enclave Clause demonstrates the importance of state
consent when lands are purchased for use as federal enclaves. It also
demonstrates the caution present in the Framers’ tone while drafting the
Enclave Clause so as not “to enslave any particular State by buying up its
territory.”219
The text and structure of the Property Clause also support Utah’s
argument. Congress was to “dispose” of its lands in forming new states
while it retained full power to make “rules and regulations” over the land
while it still held it as territorial property.220 This power also extends to
land claimed by the federal government by eminent domain. In its
argument, it is important for Utah to distinguish its case from the line of
Supreme Court Property Clause cases while still highlighting the
underlying policies of the Property Clause and Section 3 in general. To
do so, it must make clear that its argument pertains only to lands over
which the federal government does not hold valid title.
The Equal Footing Doctrine also provides, at minimum, some
rhetorical support for Utah’s position. Even though equal footing cases
generally apply only to lands underlying waterways, the Court’s broad
dicta in Pollard emphasize the United States’ policy of divesting the
federal government of lands in the process of forming new states. This
notion is repeated in the UEA when, concerning the non-committed
public land, Congress agreed that the lands “shall be sold by the United
218. Pollard v. Hansen, 44 U.S. 212, 224 (1845).
219. Gerry, supra note 109.
220. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1–2.
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States subsequent to the admission of said State into the Union.”221
Justice O’Connor’s more recent opinion in Utah Division of State Lands
v. United States also provides support for federalism ideals in the process
of state divestment of lands.222
But any hope contained in each of these possible arguments seems
doomed in light of Supreme Court precedent—particularly in relation to
the Property Clause. The Court’s broad interpretation of the clause,
together with cases that narrow the reach of the Equal Footing Doctrine
and the potential scope of the Enclave Clause, make the state’s success
going forward very unlikely. Utah’s best chance of success lies in the
somewhat untouched potential that the Enclave Clause holds, particularly
when read together with Utah’s century-old Enabling Act. Like the
soldiers surrounding the Philadelphia statehouse in 1783, it seems that
Utah legislators’ demands will be unfulfilled by the federal government.
But even if their case is unsuccessful in full, they have succeeded in
scaling back the Obama Administration’s restrictive land use policies.
*Spencer Driscoll

221. Utah Enabling Act, 28 Stat. 107 § 9 (1894) (emphasis added).
222. 482 U.S. 193 (1987).
* JD candidate, April 2013, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University.
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